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Editorial on the Research Topic
Perception–Cognition Interface and Cross-Modal Experiences: Insights into Unified
Consciousness
The present Research Topic explores closely related aspects of mental functioning, namely an
interplay between perception and cognition, interactions among various sensory modalities, and
finally, more or less unified conscious experiences arising in the context of these relations.
Contributions emphasize a high flexibility observed in perception and may be seen as potential
challenges to the traditional modular architecture of perceptual systems. Although the articles
describe different phenomena, they follow one common theme—to investigate broadly understood
unified experience—by studying either perception–cognition integration or the integration
between sensorymodalities. These integrative processesmay well apply to subpersonal unconscious
representations. However, the aim here is to approach phenomenal experience and thus a
straightforward way of thinking about it is in terms of conscious perception.
One of the seemingly principled divisions in the human mind is between sense perception
and high-level cognition. Traditionally, perception and cognition have been viewed as distinct,
encapsulated domains operating independently of each other (Fodor, 1983, 1984, 2008; Pylyshyn,
1999, 2003; Barrett, 2005; Heck, 2007; Firestone and Scholl, 2014). However, recent studies support
a different view about the impact of perception on cognition (Barsalou, 2009, 2012; Goldstone and
Hendrickson, 2010; Prinz, 2011; Weiskopf, 2015) as well as the various ways in which perceptual
experiences can be influenced by cognitive states such as thoughts, judgments, beliefs, intuitions,
expectations, desires, mental images, and emotions (Brockmole et al., 2002; Raftopoulos, 2011;
Lupyan, 2012; Macpherson, 2012, 2016; Siegel, 2012; Stokes, 2012; Bannert and Bartels, 2013;
Vetter andNewen, 2014; Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis, 2016). Thus, although thementioned division
between perceiving and reasoning may seem conceptually clear and unambiguous, these mental
domains become closely intertwined when our beliefs, expectations, or desires affect what we see,
hear, or taste, leading to complex phenomenal states of a hybrid nature. No matter whether we
assume that there is no dichotomy between perception and cognition (Clark, 2013; Lupyan, 2015)
or instead assume that there is a principled difference and a joint in nature between perception and
cognition (Block, submitted; cf. Firestone and Scholl, 2015), cognitive-sensory interactions can and
need to be accommodated within any of these accounts.
Perception has typically been studied in a single sense, mostly in the visual or auditory
modality (Haynes et al., 2005; Gutschalk et al., 2008; Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011; De Graaf et al., 2012). However, cross-modal experiences and heterogeneous
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multisensory interactions, in which input in one sensory
modality elicits ormodulates contents in anothermodality, reveal
that such perceptual experiences cannot be easily categorized
as belonging to only one of the senses (De Gelder and
Bertelson, 2003; Stein, 2012). Furthermore, recent studies
suggest examining the role of multisensory signals in perceptual
consciousness (Chen and Spence, 2010; De Meo et al., 2015;
Deroy et al., 2016). While processing sensory information in
cross-modal cases is generally multisensory, the result of that
processing can be interpreted as either just a sum of coexisting
modality-specific representations or an intrinsically multisensory
whole. Determining whether multisensory processing results
in a decomposable conjunction of independent unisensory
contents or in a multimodal holistic state that cannot be
parceled out into modality-specific components would provide
the needed characterization of the basic units of perceptual
consciousness (Bayne, 2014). Still, it is important to realize that
instances of successful multisensory integration and cross-modal
binding facilitated by spatio-temporal or semantic congruence
are not necessarily accompanied by unified experiences of
objects across the senses and that the complex relationship
between multisensory integration and perceptual consciousness
remains to be clarified (Deroy, 2014; c.f. Spence and Bayne,
2015).
Recent years have seen a surge of novel interdisciplinary work
questioning the received view of separate sensory systems and
traditional conceptions of different mental domains operating
independently (Shimojo and Shams, 2001; Driver and Noesselt,
2008; Bayne, 2010; Macpherson, 2011a,b; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz,
2013, 2016; Bennett and Hill, 2014; Deroy et al., 2014; de
Vignemont, 2014a,b; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2014;
O’Callaghan, 2014; Matthen, 2015; Stokes et al., 2015). For
instance, the occurrence of cross-domain interchange going
beyond the link between the sense perception and the domain
of abstract, conceptually represented entities, i.e., extending to
the domains of bodily, motor, and emotional states provides
challenges to standard methods individuating our epistemic
abilities (O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Barsalou, 2008; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2011, 2015; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012; De Coster et al., 2013; Weiss et al., 2013; Shapiro,
2014; Goldstone et al., 2015). Results of these studies point
to a significant change in our understanding of perception;
they demonstrate an emerging agreement on an integrative
picture of perception incorporating informational interactions.
All this indicates a need for a new research methodology. A
full understanding of how the mind works requires considering
multifaceted links holding between various mental domains
and their mutual impact. Our mental faculties should not only
be studied separately. They require a more holistic approach
in order to uncover their extensive capacity for interactions
producing differently unified conscious experiences.
Putting together scientific and philosophical concerns, this
special issue encourages extending the study of perceptual
experience beyond the single sense perception to advance
our understanding of the complex interdependencies between
different sensory modalities, other mental domains, and various
kinds of unifying relations within conscious experience. It
exhibits a remarkable need and benefit to study these phenomena
in tangent, and so, the articles in this Research Topic examine
a variety of ways in which our perceptual experiences may be
cross-modal or multisensory, integrated, embodied, synesthetic,
or affected by top-down influences.
Fulkerson argues that there are many forms of sensory
interaction and unity, therefore classification of sensory systems
and generated experiences is a matter of particular explanatory
projects.
Connolly suggests that it is not an automatic feature binding
mechanism that is responsible for our multimodal perceptual
experiences, but rather an associative learning process that
couples features from different sensory modalities so that we
experience them as part of the same event.
Liang et al. investigate experiential ownership of bodily
sensation and if it is guaranteed that a subject cannot be wrong
about whether it is him who feels the sensation.
Van Leeuwen et al. propose several reasons for why the
phenomenon of synesthesia and related alterations of brain
networks and functional connectivity can be of merit for
consciousness research.
Gray and Simner consider synesthesia and release phenomena
in terms of disinhibited embodiment in sensory and motor
systems respectively.
The following papers explore how perceptual processes can
fail to be modular. They discuss a range of questions regarding
cognitive effects on perception, including the issue of cognitive
penetrability of perception.
In their contribution, Masrour et al. guide readers through
philosophical issues of the debate on perceptual modularity,
emphasizing results from cognitive neuroscience against the
encapsulation thesis.
Marchi and Newen address the possibility of cognitive
penetrability of perceptual experience in the domain of social
cognition, namely visual experience of the facial expressions of
emotion.
Nanay argues that the attribution of aesthetically relevant
properties supervenes on one’s perceptual experience, i.e., if there
is a difference in such an attribution, there must also be a
difference in perceptual experience.
Briscoe considers whether intentions for action penetrate
visual experience of an object’s size by analyzing various
explanations of mechanisms possibly involved in such
penetration.
Brown claims that theories of consciousness that see it as
cognitive in nature or as an aspect of cognitive functioning such
as the higher-order thought theory of consciousness provide a
reasonable working hypothesis in the explanation of conscious
experience.
There is also some grouping among the contributions
discussing empirical results from their own studies on cross-
modal associations, sensory integration, and unified conscious
experience.
Brunel et al. demonstrate that cross-modal correspondences
influence cross-modal integration during perceptual learning,
leading to new learned units that have different stability over
time.
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Montoro et al. explore cross-modal metaphorical mapping of
auditory emotion words onto vertical visual space and conclude
that this association is not automatically activated but requires an
explicit semantic evaluation of the emotion concepts to obtain an
embodied effect.
Albertazzi et al. examine the existence of cross-modal
associations between highly complex stimuli (i.e., materic
painting and classical guitar music) due to patterns of
qualitative similarity present in stimuli of different sensory
modalities.
Finally, Winkielman et al. propose that unified consciousness
is constructed from cross-modal inputs via integrated processing
experiences, an experiential mechanism that combines signals of
processing quality.
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